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Rootways Authorize.net CIM: Apple Pay SSRF exploited on Magento stores

Sansec

by Sansec Forensics Team

Published in Threat Research − November 17, 2026

The Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension for Magento 2 lets anyone read server files and reach internal services through its Apple Pay endpoint (CVE-2026-130583, CVSS 9.2). On November 15, an attacker used it to take over a Magento store and plant a payment skimmer. Rootways fixed the flaw in version 4.1.5.

Rootways Authorize.net CIM: Apple Pay SSRF exploited on Magento stores
Exploited in the wild, fixed in 4.1.5. Tracked as CVE-2026-130583 (CVSS 9.2, critical). Sansec reported the flaw to Rootways on November 16. Rootways released version 4.1.5 with a fix on November 17. All earlier versions are vulnerable. Upgrade now. Until you have upgraded, disable Apple Pay.

Sansec found the flaw while investigating a hacked Magento 2.4.8 store. The attacker read the store's database password and encryption key through the Apple Pay endpoint, created an admin account, got code execution and injected a WebSocket skimmer into every page. The whole chain took 14 hours.

Who is affected

Rootways sells the Authorize.net CIM payment module for Magento 2 (Composer package rootways/module-authorizecim, module Rootways_Authorizecim). Rootways fixed the flaw in version 4.1.5, released on November 17. Its changelog says: "Security fix: Apple Pay merchant validation now only connects to Apple Pay servers over HTTPS. All earlier versions are affected." That includes 4.1.4 from October 29, whose Apple Pay fix did not address this flaw. We confirmed version 4.0.0 as vulnerable during our investigation.

Rootways handled our report well. It released the fix one day after we reported the flaw. It also published a security advisory that names the affected versions and tells customers to update even when Apple Pay is turned off. For merchants who cannot upgrade the whole extension right away, Rootways offers a patch that replaces only the two changed files.

We reviewed the patched controller. It only accepts an https:// URL on an Apple Pay gateway host (apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com or cn-apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com) with a /paymentservices/ path, rebuilds the URL from those checked parts, and limits curl to HTTPS without redirects.

Check your installed version:

composer show rootways/module-authorizecim
# or, for app/code installs
grep '"version"' app/code/Rootways/Authorizecim/composer.json

The flaw

Apple Pay on the web needs a merchant validation step: the store server asks Apple for a session and passes it to the browser. The Rootways controller at /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index takes the Apple URL from a validationUrl request parameter and fetches it with curl. It does not check the host or the protocol, and it returns the fetched content to the visitor. It needs no login.

That is a server-side request forgery (CWE-918) with a full read primitive. It is tracked as CVE-2026-130583, rated 9.2 (critical) on CVSS 4.0. Because curl also speaks file://, gopher:// and dict://, an anonymous visitor can:

  1. Read any file the PHP user can read, including app/etc/env.php with the database credentials and the Magento encryption key.
  2. Send raw bytes to services that only listen on the server itself, such as Redis, Memcached, a database manager or the backend web server.
  3. Query the cloud metadata service of the hosting provider.

Investigation of one breach

Sansec investigated one particular breach: a Magento 2.4.8 store on Cloudways, running Rootways 4.0.0 with Apple Pay enabled. On November 15, the attacker sent 8,272 requests to the store's Apple Pay endpoint from 19 IP addresses.

The first file the attacker read was app/etc/env.php, which contains the database password, the encryption key and the admin URL. The attacker then used the store's Redis server, which had no password, to try to write files to disk. That failed.

Next, the attacker read /proc/net/tcp to list the ports the server listened on. Port 8082 turned out to run Adminer, the database manager that Cloudways installs by default. With the database password from env.php, the attacker logged in to Adminer through the SSRF, added their own admin account and sent 887 SQL statements over the next hours.

From the admin panel, the attacker got code execution and dropped a web shell at pub/media_sync.php. A cleanup script then deleted 2,408 error reports and helper files to cover their tracks. Later that day, a skimmer loader appeared in the design/head/includes configuration. It sends card data over a WebSocket to 45-86-62-180.sslip.io.

The step from admin to code execution reused the same endpoint. When curl fails to fetch a URL, the controller throws an error and Magento writes an error report to var/report/ that contains the full request URL. The attacker added a parameter with PHP code to a failing request, so Magento wrote that code to disk. They then loaded the report file through an admin email template preview, using the same template include trick as StyleSmuggler.

The attacker

Most of the attack came from 37.72.140.221 (Galeon LLC, AS211663, Russia), which sent 5,501 of the 8,272 requests to the Apple Pay endpoint. The other requests came from 18 more addresses. Reconnaissance started the evening before, at 22:58 UTC on November 14, with attempts to exploit PolyShell, SessionReaper, StyleSmuggler and BlockStrap. Shield blocked most of those.

The skimmer sends stolen card data to 45-86-62-180.sslip.io. The free sslip.io service maps that name to 45.86.62.180 (Local NCC Ltd., AS212171, hosted in the Netherlands), so the attacker needed no domain registration.

IP addressNetworkCountryRole
37.72.140.221Galeon LLC, AS211663RUSSRF exploitation, 5,501 requests
45.86.62.180Local NCC Ltd., AS212171NLSkimmer WebSocket collector
45.166.20.61J S Caminha Servicos de Internet, AS264105BRAttack infrastructure
54.39.16.34OVH SAS, AS16276CAAttack infrastructure
2.27.168.28Dedik Services Limited, AS207043FIAttack infrastructure

Every probe carried an incrementing marker, I038 to I095, in file names and output strings (such as i086_marker.txt and I075HELLO). That looks like an automated or agent-driven operator working through numbered attempts. For code execution, the attacker wrote an LD_PRELOAD library to /tmp/i086_x.so in 25 chunks and ran commands through PHP's putenv() and mail().

What merchants should do

  1. Upgrade the Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension to 4.1.5 or later. If you cannot upgrade the whole extension right away, apply the two-file patch from the Rootways advisory. If you bought it on the Adobe Commerce Marketplace and 4.1.5 is not listed there yet, ask Rootways for it.
  2. Until you have upgraded, disable Apple Pay in the extension: set payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active to 0 and flush the cache. You can also block requests to the endpoint at the web server when validationUrl is not an https:// URL on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com.
  3. If Apple Pay was enabled, assume compromise: rotate the database password and the crypt/key in env.php, review admin_user for unknown accounts, and check core_config_data for changes to design/head/includes.
  4. Scan with eComscan to find web shells and skimmers.
  5. Put a password on Redis and restrict Adminer or other database tools to trusted IP addresses. On Cloudways, Adminer listens on port 8082 by default.
  6. Use Sansec Shield to block attacks. Since November 16 it has rules for this SSRF and for gopher URLs in requests.

Indicators of compromise

Requests:

/rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index?validationUrl=<anything not on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com>
/rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index?...&z=<?=

Files:

pub/media_sync.php
var/report/i08*_*.php
var/report/i086w.php
var/report/cache_report.so
/tmp/i086_x.so  sha256 0ef70175c37ae25c9495725912ef4988234c5db068bbace50d6c80144ece1231
/tmp/i086_cmd.sh
/tmp/i087w.php

Strings in files, database or logs:

msync7a3f91
I086PUB-
X-I086: pub
@media.sync
G-HE9K4M2P8R
__hybridWs

Network:

45-86-62-180.sslip.io
45.86.62.180
37.72.140.221
45.166.20.61
54.39.16.34
2.27.168.28

Timeline

DateEvent
2025-06-02Rootways releases version 4.0.0
2026-11-15Attacker exploits the flaw on a Magento store
2026-11-16Sansec finds the root cause during forensic investigation
2026-11-16Sansec reports the flaw to Rootways
2026-11-16Sansec Shield blocks the attack
2026-11-17Sansec publishes this advisory
2026-11-17Rootways releases version 4.1.5 with a fix and publishes an advisory
2026-11-17VulnCheck assigns CVE-2026-130583, rated CVSS 9.2

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